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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2004, insurgents attacked a United States military convoy
in Fallujah, Iraq, killing four of its members.' The bodies were mutilated,
burned, and hung from a bridge.2 This incident quickly became infamous
due to its shocking brutality.
3
The Fallujah incident was also newsworthy for a second reason. Those
killed in the attack were not members of the United States military, but rather
employees of Blackwater Worldwide,4 a private security company (PSC).5
Blackwater was under contract with the U. S. government to provide extra
security forces and to perform other duties typically performed by U.S. sol-
diers.6 The Fallujah fallout was the first time many Americans became
aware of the existence of such agreements, and for those who were aware of
the existence of PSCs, the extent to which the government relies on them.
The existence and use of PSCs is controversial, and much academic dis-
course is available on the subject.7 Much of this is centered on their use in
Iraq and other military zones.8 It is claimed that these entities are mercena-
ries who operate lawlessly and with no accountability. 9 The proposed solu-
tions focus on international law, statutes aimed at military activities, and
* The author is a law clerk to the Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff, United States Dis-
trict Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan. The author would like to thank Professor
Susan Bitenksy of the Michigan State University College of Law for her guidance throughout
the writing process.
I. See, e.g., U.S. Expects More Attacks in Iraq, CNN.coM, May 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/ 2004IWORLD/meastl03/311 iraq.main/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009); see
also infra Part 11.C.2.
2. U.S. Expects More Attacks in Iraq, CNN.coM, May 6, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004/world/meast/03/31/iraq.main/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009)
3. See id.
4. This company was formerly known as "Blackwater USA", and has recently again
changed names, operating now as "Xe".
5. See Jonathan Finer, Recent Development, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accoun-
tability Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 259, 259 (2008).
6. See id. at 260.
7. See id. at 259.
8. See id.at 259-60.
9. See id.
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contract law.' ° The United States Constitution has been essentially ignored
as an avenue of recourse." This may be reasonable when discussing acts
concerning the military or Iraqi citizens. However, PSCs can also affect U.S.
citizens, who are entitled to the protections of the Constitution.
This article narrows this focus to the relationship between PSCs and
American citizens. Specifically, this article raises the previously unanswered
question of whether PSCs, when contracting with federal or state govern-
ments, are state actors. If they are determined to be state actors, then they
would be liable for violations of the Constitution, especially the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 2
The practical application of this determination would be whether a U.S. citi-
zen would have recourse if a PSC, acting under contract with a state or fed-
eral government, violated that citizen's federal constitutional rights.
This article argues that PSCs should be considered state actors when
carrying out obligations under contract with a state or federal government.
Thus, a citizen aggrieved by a PSC in this manner would have the same me-
thods of recourse as he or she would if an actual government actor had
caused the claimed injury, including a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. How-
ever, this is not necessarily a green light to sue, as the aggrieved must also
have a pleadable cause of action and the prospective defendant must be sub-
ject to suit. 3
Part I describes the use of PSCs in the Hurricane Katrina aftermath. It
then discusses the controversial events regarding PSCs in Iraq. Part R serves
as a refresher on the state action doctrine, discusses its various exceptions,
and analyzes the case law dealing with privately contracted security guards.
Part III examines the law regarding section 1983 claims and analyzes the
case law applying section 1983 to privately run prisons. Part V offers the
analysis of PSCs under the state action doctrine and argues that a PSC is a
state actor when performing work under government contract if it violates
the federal constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen. Part V provides a brief
description on how suits might proceed-or not proceed-under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 after a violation has occurred.
10. See Finer, supra note 5, at 260-63.
II. See id. at 261-65.
12. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929-30 (1982).
13. Id. at 930 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)). See
infra Part V for a discussion of how these requirements affect a suit against a state actor.
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II. THE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES
This part will focus on Blackwater's presence in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina. While this article's thesis remains hypothetical at this
point, the fact that PSCs have operated within the United States, makes this
thesis more of a prediction of future events than pure conjecture. It will then
describe Blackwater's controversial actions in Iraq to help advance the claim
that these entities and their employees do participate in actions that would be,
at best, questionable if subjected to federal constitutional scrutiny. Finally, it
will summarize the current lawsuits pending against Blackwater to show the
lack of remedies when a PSC acts abroad. This article attempts to provide a
remedy for U.S. citizens when PSCs act domestically under either state or
federal contract, as was the case with Blackwater in New Orleans.
A. The Rise of Private Security Companies14
PSCs are nothing new, and the U.S. military has utilized private con-
tractors since the American Revolution.' 5 One author notes the use of pri-
vately contracted ships outnumbered the U.S. Navy in the War of 1812.16
The use of PSCs exploded during Vietnam and has risen steadily ever
since. 7 One explanation is that the demilitarization after the end of the Cold
War helped increase the number of PSCs. 18 The current numbers are stag-
gering. It is estimated that more than 30,000 employees of PSCs are current-
ly in Iraq.' 9
14. This section is intended to give a very brief description of how the use of PSCs came
about. For a much more in-depth discussion and description of how these entities operate, see
generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY (2003).
15. Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with
Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 234 (2000).
16. Finer, supra note 5, at 259.
17. See id. at 259-60; See Davidson, supra note 15, at 235.
18. E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security In-
dustry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 221, 224 (2008).
19. JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND,
LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 3 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order
Code RL32419, Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf.
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B. Involvement in New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina
While Blackwater is most infamously known for its actions in Iraq, it
also contracts to perform operations within the United States. 20 Blackwater
initially deployed approximately 150 personnel to help with security after
Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.2' This number would later swell by at
least another hundred.22 Blackwater issued a press release stating that it was
donating aerial support and that airlift, security, humanitarian support, and
logistics and transportation services would be available.23 However, its pres-
ence also included ground personnel, which charged the government $950 a
day per employee.24 It is claimed that Blackwater was paid a total of $73
million in less than a year in New Orleans.25
However, at least for the purpose of this article, the financial aspects re-
garding PSCs are not as troubling as their actions. Blackwater employees
were heavily armed with automatic weapons in New Orleans.26 They pa-
trolled the streets in khaki uniforms with an armband as their only identifica-
tion as Blackwater employees.27 They patrolled in SUVs or other vehicles,
sometimes marked with the Blackwater logo, sometimes not.28 They operat-
ed under contract with the Department of Homeland Security and at least
some were deputized by the State of Louisiana.29
While there were no incidents in New Orleans that gained the press that
the incidents in Iraq did, questionable conduct still went on, this time involv-
ing-assumedly-U.S. citizens.30 Scahill reports of an interview with a PSC
employee who was transporting wealthy business owners in New Orleans.3'
20. See Griff Witte, Private Security Contractors Head to Gulf, WASH. POST, Sept. 8,
2005, at A 14.
21. See id.
22. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
MERCENARY ARMY 325 (2007). "On September 18, Blackwater estimated that it had 250
troops deployed in the region; a number Mathews said would continue to grow." Id.
23. Press Release, Blackwater Tactical Weekly, Blackwater Joins Hurricane Katrina
Relief Effort! (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://www.libertyparkusafd.org/lp/Hale/Special
%20Reports%5CBlackwaterUSA%5CBlackwater%20Tactical%2OWeekly.htm.
24. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 326.
25. Id. at 327. So much for Blackwater's claims that "'[w]e don't believe we will make a
profit here' and "'[i]f we break even on the security services, our company will have done a
great job."' Id. at 325.
26. Id. at 321-24. "[W]hat poured in fastest were guns. Lots of guns." Id. at 323.
27. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 321.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 324.
30. See id. at 327-28.
31. See id. at 328-29.
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He claims that the "convoy came under fire," and the employees "unleashed
a barrage of bullets in the general direction of the alleged shooters. 32 While
this was likely self-defense, what is more troubling was the lack of investiga-
tion by either the Army or state troopers.33 "'[T]hey didn't even care. They
just left .... [W]e all coordinate with each other-one family."'" This sug-
gests that PSCs were seen as equals of state and federal actors in their law
enforcement status.
35
Despite this, and the continued uproar over Blackwater's presence in
Iraq36, its presence in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina has been essen-
tially ignored.37 However, as Hurricane Katrina was certainly financially
successful for Blackwater, there is no reason to think that domestic activity
will not continue in the future. 38 This presents troubling state action prob-
lems that are discussed infra.39
C. Private Security Companies in Iraq and Controversies
This article is applicable to all PSCs, but Blackwater Worldwide will
operate as the primary example, due to its infamy in the U.S. media and its
involvement in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The latter establishes
the fact that state governments have used-and presumably will continue to
use-PSCs.40 It is apparent in the Hurricane Katrina aftermath that PSCs are
not utilized solely by the U.S. military.4' Likewise, one author notes that
PSCs realize that there is potential in expanding operations within the United
States: "'The private security firm Blackwater is seeking to diversify its
business by reaching out to U.S. state and local governments that may lack
infrastructure or capacity to respond to natural disasters and terrorist at-
tacks., 42 This is important for this article, as it avoids the rather complex
32. SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 328-29.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. In January, 2009, the U.S. State Department announced that Blackwater's contract to
operate in Iraq would not be renewed. It is unclear, however, when Blackwater will fully
withdraw its employees. See U.S. Will Not Renew Blackwater Contract in Iraq, REUTERS.
COM, Jan 30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GCA-iraq/idUSTRE50p352009
0131.
37. See id. at 330.
38. See Brent D. Hessel, United Nations Update, 15 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 53, 54 (2007).
39. See infra Part V.
40. See Hessel, supra note 38, at 54.
41. See id.
42. Id. Hessel points out that Blackwater's effectiveness was not questioned, but its cost
was. Id.
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issues of military immunity that would arise if Blackwater was solely con-
tracted to provide soldiers on foreign soil as a military supplement.4 3
1. Controversial Incidents Involving Blackwater in Iraq
Blackwater's initial foray into Iraq was when it Was awarded a no-bid
$27.7 million contract to provide security detail for L. Paul Bremer III, the
Coalition Provisional Authority for the invasion.44 Even after Bremer's de-
parture, Blackwater stayed in Iraq on various security details. 45 In March
2007, Time Magazine reported that Blackwater had been paid $320 million
for its services in Iraq.46 Among Blackwater's current responsibilities is pro-
viding security for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.47
Several controversial incidents have marked Blackwater's tenure in
Iraq. The first was the killing of four Blackwater employees in an attack by
Iraqi opposition forces on March 31, 2004.48 Their bodies were burned and
hung from a bridge overlooking the Euphrates River.49 The images were
broadcast on television. 50 This has been described as "a turning point in pub-
lic opinion about the war.,
51
The Committee on Oversight and Reform (Committee) launched an in-
vestigation into the Fallujah incident as to whether Blackwater properly
trained and supplied its employees.5 2 The Committee concluded it had not.
53
43. Although the Justice Department's recent indictment of five Blackwater employees
on manslaughter charges for their involvement in the Nissor Square massacre suggests that
this area of the law is in flux. Despite this "'unprecedented use of the law"', it is much too
early in the proceedings to determine the likelihood of conviction. Ginger Thompson and
James Risen, Plea by Blackwater Guard Helps Indict Others, NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 8, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/washington/09blackwater.html?ref=us
44. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 68-69. Scahill notes that the contract was awarded
after the Secret Service had assessed the situation as too dangerous for its men. Id. at 69.
45. See id. at 164-65.
46. See Brian Bennett, Victims of an Outsourced War, TIME.COM, Mar. 15, 2007,
http://www.time.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171.1 599682,00.html.
47. U.S. Embassy Resumes Use of Blackwater Security, USATODAY.COM, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-09-21 -iraq-blackwaterN.htm.
48. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, I IOTH CONG.,
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER'S ACTIONS IN
FALLUJAH 4 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20070927104643.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS].
49. Report: Blackwater 'Impeded' Probe into Contractors Deaths, CNN.cOM, Sept. 27,
2007, http://www.cnn.com2007/POLITICS/09/27/iraq.blackwater/index.html.
50. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 48, at 4.
51. Id.
52. See Id. at 2.
20091
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Due to this finding, the Committee also concluded that "[t]hese actions raise
serious questions about the consequences of engaging private, for-profit enti-
ties to engage in essentially military operations in a war zone."'54 The Fallu-
jah incident sparked questions about whether Blackwater is liable for injuries
suffered by its own employees.55
A much more controversial incident led to questions about Blackwater's
liability to third parties harmed by its conduct.56 On September 16, 2007, a
group of Blackwater troops were involved in a gunfire attack on Iraqi citi-
zens in Nisour Square in Baghdad, killing seventeen while wounding twenty-
four others.57 The fallout from this incident was fierce. The Iraqi govern-
ment immediately revoked Blackwater's license to operate in Iraq.58  The
State Department official in charge of PSCs in Iraq resigned.59 Blackwater
CEO Erik Prince took a trip to Capitol Hill to face a Congressional commit-
tee.6' In addition, an American watchdog group filed a lawsuit on behalf of
the Iraqi victims' estates.6' This incident has fueled the debate regarding
Blackwater's legality and accountability. 62
2. Pending Lawsuits
Blackwater currently has two lawsuits pending, both resulting from in-
cidents that occurred in Iraq.63 The first was filed by the estates of the four
53. Id. at 17. Among Blackwater's shortcomings were undertaking a mission before its
contract began and one that it had been previously warned about as too dangerous, not provid-
ing properly armed vehicles and weapons, and sending out a team two members short. Id.
54. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 48, at 17.
55. See infra Part I1.C.2 for a description of the lawsuit stemming from the Fallujah
incident brought by the victims' estates.
56. See Paul von Zielbauer & James Glanz, Under Siege, Blackwater Takes on Air of
Bunker, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com12007/10/25/world/middle
east/25blackwater.html?hp=&pagewanted=all.
57. Id.
58. Iraq Battle Was Self-Defense, Security Firm Says, CNN.coM, Sept. 18, 2007,
http://www.cnn.conV2007IWORLD/meast/09/17/iraq.main/index.html [hereinafter Iraq Battle
Was Self-Defense].
59. Zielbauer & Glanz, supra note 56.
60. See John M. Broder, Chief of Blackwater Defends His Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 2007, at A8.
61. See generally Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Abtan v. Blackwater Worldwide,
No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2007); see infra Part 11.C.2 for a discussion of this law-
suit.
62. See generally Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, supra note 61.
63. See Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, L.L.C., 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 803 (E.D.
N.C. 2005); Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, supra note 61, at 3.
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Blackwater employees killed in the Fallujah attack in March 2004.64 The
lawsuit states claims for wrongful death and fraud. 65 It was originally filed
in state court and later removed to federal court.66 The federal district court
remanded it to state court.67 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
remand unreviewable and refused to issue a writ of mandamus. 68 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 69
The second lawsuit was filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights on
behalf of victims of the September 2007 attack on Iraqi civilians.70 The
amended complaint claims, inter alia, violations of the Alien Tort Claims
Act, wrongful death, and negligent hiring and supervision.7' Blackwater is
again in a jurisdictional battle, but this time over the proper federal forum. 72
Blackwater's motion to dismiss or transfer has yet to be ruled on.73
The existence of these lawsuits shows that Blackwater is certainly not
immune to suit. However, they address statutory and common law viola-
tions. The remaining question is whether Blackwater is answerable for fed-
eral constitutional violations. This may seem conjectural at this point, but its
actions in Louisiana certainly foreshadow such a situation, especially given
its track record in Iraq. Thus, this article will analyze Blackwater-and any
other PSC in a similar situation-under the traditional state action doctrine.
It will argue that Blackwater is a state actor when it contracts with the federal
or state governments and is therefore answerable for any federal constitu-
tional violations that it may inflict on U.S. citizens.74
64. Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 814.
68. In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, L.L.C., 460 F.3d 576, 595 (4th Cir. 2006).
69. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, L.L.C. v. Nordan, 549 U.S. 1260, 1260 (2007).
70. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, supra note 61, at 18.
71. Id. at 14-15, 17.
72. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Lack of Venue and
to Dismiss Non-Legal Entities at I, Abtan v. Blackwater Worldwide, No. 1:07-cv-01831
(D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2008). The case is currently filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Id. Blackwater suggests the court should dismiss the entire suit for
filing in an improper venue, or alternatively, transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.
73. See Court Docket, Abtan v. Blackwater Worldwide, No. 1:07-cv-0 1831 (D.D.C. Oct.
11,2007).
74. This is not to insinuate that PSCs automatically will act in such a way. Therefore,
this analysis does remain hypothetical to a certain extent. What is more certain is that gov-
ernments will continue to utilize PSCs for certain matters and that it is possible that such a
claim could arise in the near future. This is especially true if PSCs continue to act outside of
military operations, such as Blackwater did during the Hurricane Katrina aftermath.
2009]
9
Dittenber: Blackwater and Beyond: Can Potential Plaintiffs Sue Private Secur
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
I1I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
This part provides a description of the state action doctrine and its his-
torical path. It then introduces the major strands of the doctrine and summa-
rizes the seminal cases from which they sprung. It then focuses on two ex-
ceptions most pertinent to this article's discussion that PSCs will later be
analyzed under:75 The exclusive and traditional state function exception and
the nexus exception. Finally, this part describes how courts have historically
treated private security guards under the state action doctrine.
A. The Origins of the State Action Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was passed in 1868.76
Among other things, it promulgated that a state may not "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 7 7 One of the first
cases the Supreme Court applied this clause to was the Civil Rights Cases
7 8
in 1883.79 In these consolidated cases, the underlying issue was whether a
private entity could still enforce its racially discriminatory policies. 80 The
Court held that the Amendment did not apply to private actors.8 ' As opposed
to this private discrimination, "[i]t is State action of a particular character
75. See infra Part Ill B.
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 596 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
79. Id. at 9. The Amendment had come up before, but under different circumstances.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876). In Cruikshank, the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights and that the Bill of Rights was
only applicable to the federal government. id. at 551-52. This holding, of course, has been
chipped away over the years through the doctrine of selective incorporation. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment freedom from double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment
right to trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the
Fourth Amendment freedom from unlawful search and seizure); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the First Amendment's provision preventing the establishment of
a religion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (incorporating the
Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) (incorporating the freedoms of the First Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925).
80. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9-Il.
81. Id. at 11.
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that is prohibited. 82 The Court also clarified the power given to Congress in
the final section of the Amendment. 83 Congress has only the power "[t]o
adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited
state laws and state acts." 4 That is, Congress can invalidate state action that
violates the Amendment, but it cannot invalidate similar private action. 5
The debate soon centered on the definition of state action. Some state
action is easily discernable, for example, an actual discriminatory state law
86
or action taken by a state employee.87 A somewhat more difficult case is the
doctrine's application to government agencies. For example, in Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp.,88 the National Railroad Passenger Cor-
poration-more popularly known as Amtrak-was held to be a government
agent, thus subject to federal constitutional requirements.89 The Court held
that when "the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the fur-
therance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authori-
ty to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is
part of the Government." 90 This has not been interpreted as an automatic
finding that all government agencies are state actors; rather, it is a factual
finding based on each specific agency's makeup.91 For example, the Ninth
Circuit held the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation-Freddie Mac-
not to be a state actor for due process purposes.92 This decision was based on
82. Id.
83. Id. The text of that section is: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
84. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
85. See id. That is, it cannot invalidate discriminatory private action using the power
granted to it by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. However, it can-and
has-regulated discriminatory private action with other powers, notably its Commerce Clause
power. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (affirming
Congress' power to regulate private hotel from discriminating against blacks under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (affirming Congress'
power to regulate private restaurants under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
86. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971).
87. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
88. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
89. Id. at 400. Amtrak was created under the Railroad Passenger Service Act of 1970.
Id. at 383-84; see also 45 U.S.C. § 501 (2000), repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379, 1386. Lebron dealt with a First Amendment issue regarding
political advertising directed against the Coors family-of Coors Brewing fame. Lebron, 513
U.S. at 376-77.
90. Id. at 400.
91. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d
1401, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996).
92. Id.
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the level of control the government had on the make-up of the board of direc-
tors, holding it was much less than in Lebron.93
However, there are exceptions to the state action doctrine in certain cir-
cumstances where the private entity's actions could legitimately be attributed
to the state. 94 The literature on the subject varies. One academic counts six
distinct categories in which state action could be found.95 Another names
two main categories, with the second consisting of three subcategories.96
Regardless of the nomenclature of the various exceptions, the overreaching
idea is the same: Under certain circumstances, a private entity will be consi-
dered a state actor.
B. The State Action Doctrine as Applied to Private Entities
The next section will focus on two commonly litigated exceptions that
would most likely be discussed in a case involving a PSC: the exclusive and
traditional public function exception and the nexus exception.
I. Traditional and Exclusive Governmental Functions
One area that will subject a private actor to the state action doctrine is
when that actor is performing a traditional state function.97 This exception
has been narrowed to include only those functions which are "traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State." 98 This exception has its beginning in
the White Primary Cases, a collection of Supreme Court rulings dealing with
93. id. at 1407-09. In an interesting dichotomy, while Freddie Mac is not a government
actor for state action purposes, a federal district court has held that it is a government actor for
immunity purposes. See Paslowski v. Standard Mortgage Corp. of Ga., 129 F. Supp. 2d 793,
800-01 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
94. See generally G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doc-
trine: The Searchfor Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REV. 333 (1997).
95. Id. at 344. Professor Buchanan claims the following six situations came about, albeit
some of them indirectly, from the Civil Rights Cases decision: Public Function, State Nexus,
Beyond-State-Authority, Projection-of-State-Authority, State Authorization, and State Inac-
tion. Id. at 344-53.
96. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1995).
Professor Krotoszynski claims the two main categories are whether the actor is a state agency
and whether the actor has sufficient contacts with the state. Id. at 306, 314. The "contacts"
category is further broken down into: exclusive government functions, symbiotic relation-
ships, and the nexus test. Id.
97. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
98. Id. at 353.
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the denial of black citizens' right to vote in state primary elections. 99 To
synthesize, the Court held that although the Democratic Party of Texas, a
private entity, was responsible for the questioned elections, the elections
were ultimately regulated by state law.'0° Thus, the Democratic Party was
answerable for its violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
when it excluded black citizens on the basis of race.'0 ' This was later ex-
tended to a private organization known as the Jaybird Democratic Associa-
tion, which claimed it was a completely private and voluntary organization,
not a state-regulated political party. 0 2 The Court so held that "[t]he Jaybird
primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the
elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county. 10 3
The Court added another situation to the public function prong in Marsh
v. Alabana.' 4 In Marsh, the plaintiff was a Jehovah's Witness claiming a
violation of her First Amendment freedoms of press and religion. 10 5 The
defendant was a corporately owned town which claimed it had no federal
constitutional liability. 0 6  The Court held the city liable, noting that
"[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion."'0 7 It further rea-
soned that the city's actions, by opening up its property for public use and
then regulating it, resulted in it being a traditional public function. 08
The public function exception was further discussed in Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks.' °9 In Flagg Bros., the Court held that a firm executing a lien sale
pursuant to statute was not an exclusive traditional state function, although it
is usually thought to be a sheriff's duty."0 The Court noted that "[c]reditors
and debtors have had available to them historically a far wider number of
choices than has one who would be an elected public official, or a member of
Jehovah's Witnesses who wished to distribute literature in Chickasaw, Ala.,
99. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
100. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 663-64; Condon, 286 U.S. at 89.
101. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 666; Condon, 286 U.S. at 89.
102. Terry, 345 U.S. at 462-63.
103. Id. at 469.
104. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
105. Id. at 504.
106. Id. at 502.
107. Id. at 506.
108. Id. The Court likened this to private companies that build and operate bridges, fer-
ries, and roadways. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. "Since these facilities are built and operated
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is
subject to state regulation." Id.
109. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
110. Id. at 161-62.
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at the time Marsh was decided."''. Due to the variety of options, creditors
and debtors had to solve their dispute; the Court held that the lien sale was
not a function exclusive to the state."12 It also noted that there were several
areas that would be better suited to the extension of the exception before
creditor rights: "Among these are such functions as education, fire and po-
lice protection, and tax collection."' 13 The Court only mentioned these as
possibilities and of course, declined to rule on any of them.' 14
2. Nexus/Entanglement
This section will attempt to synthesize the line of cases that address pri-
vate action that is not a traditional government function, but yet involves
such close activity with the state that the entity's behavior can be attributed
to the state. Nomenclature of this prong varies, with terms such as "joint
activity," "nexus," "entanglement," and "symbiotic relationship" being used
in cases. However, the underlying premise is that the state and private actor
have such a close relationship that the line between them becomes blurred.
a. Private Action That Is State Action
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," 5 the Court held that the
symbiotic relationship between a restaurant and a parking structure operated
by the State was sufficiently close to require the restaurant to meet the man-
dates of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 Burton involved a privately-owned
restaurant that refused to serve the plaintiff, who was black. 1 7 The restau-
rant was located on the ground floor of a publicly owned parking lot, and it
leased its business space from the operating state agency." 8 The State used
the proceeds from the lease to help with the financing of and payment for the
structure. '9 The lease provided that the State would include certain utilities
and be responsible for most repairs. 20 In addition, the restaurant enjoyed a
11. Id. at162.
112. Id. at 163. "[E]ven if we were inclined to extend the sovereign-function doctrine
outside of its present carefully confined bounds, the field of private commercial transactions
would be a particularly inappropriate area into which to expand it." Id.
113. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163.
114. Id. at 163-64.
115. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
116. See id. at 716, 726.
117. Id. at 716.
118. Id.
119. Seeid. at719.
120. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 720.
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public tax exemption for any improvements to the property that would be
considered fixtures.' 2' Signs hung from the structure stating its public nature
and the state and national flags flew above it.
122
The Court considered the fact that this set-up was mutually beneficial to
both parties; the restaurant's patrons had a convenient place to park, and the
State profited from their use of the structure. 123 The Court attempted to nar-
row its holding by recognizing that "a multitude of relationships might ap-
pear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace" and by insisting that
this is to be a factual inquiry. 24 In this case, the Court emphasized that the
State went further than mere acquiescence to the discrimination; it instead
"elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted dis-
crimination."'' 25 Based on the above factors, the Court found that by the mu-
tual benefits conferred between the State and the restaurant, "[t]he State
[had] so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle
that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.' ' 26
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 127 the Court addressed an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution banning the State from regulating discrimination in prop-
erty transactions except in those transactions where the State was the proper-
ty owner. 28 Among its effects, the amendment nullified two state civil sta-
tutes penalizing discrimination in housing transactions. 29 California argued
that it was simply taking a neutral position to private housing discrimina-
tion. 3° The Court disagreed, stating that the amendment "changed the situa-
tion from one in which discrimination was restricted 'to one wherein it is
encouraged, within the meaning of the cited decisions."",13' Thus, the State
was now "'at least a partner in the instant act of discrimination '"1 32 The
Court explained that by enacting the amendment, the State went beyond re-
peal of the civil provisions. 3 3 Instead of relying on mere "personal choice"
121. Id. at 719.
122. Id. at 720.
123. Id. at 724.
124. Id. at 726.
125. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. The Court also recognized the irony "that in one part of a
single building, erected and maintained with public funds by an agency of the State to serve a
public purpose, all persons have equal rights, while in another portion, also serving the public,
a Negro is a second-class citizen, offensive because of his race." Id. at 724.
126. Id. at 725.
127. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
128. See id. at 370-71.
129. See id. at 372.
1130. See id. at 376.
13i. Id. at375.
132. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375.
133. See id. at 377.
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to discriminate, one "could now invoke express constitutional authority" to
do so. 34 This led the Court to conclude that the State had "significantly in-
volved itself with invidious discriminations" and that this state action vi-
olated the Fourteenth Amendment. 135
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n, 136 the Court held that a high school athletic association was a state
actor when enforcing its rules against member schools. 137 Although the As-
sociation was comprised of both public and private high schools, the Court
held that the "pervasive entwinement" between the Association and public
high school officials required a finding of state action.'38 Examples of this
entwinement included: the fact that each member-school was represented by
a faculty or administration member acting within his or her scope of duty,
that meetings were often held during school hours, and that the schools pro-
vided a small part of the Association's funding. 39 There was a financial
relationship between the public schools and the Association as well. 140 In
exchange for the services the Association provided in scheduling and regu-
lating athletic events within the state, it received dues from the member-
schools and a portion of the sales generated by the events.' 4' Not only were
the public officials involved in the Association, they overwhelmingly per-
formed "all but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists
and functions in practical terms."'' 4
2
The Court referred to this presence of public school officials as "bottom
up" entwinement. 43 It also found what it termed "top down" entwinement.' 44
The Court noted that State Board of Education members were assigned to
134. Id.
135. Id. at 376, 380-81.
136. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
137. See id. at 290-91.
138. Id. at 291. The Court noted that 84% of the member-schools are public, and that the
16% which are private prevent "this entwinement of the Association and the public school
system from being total and their identities totally indistinguishable." Id. at 299-300. The
dissent was unimpressed with "entwinement" as the basis of the majority's holding. Id. at 305
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We have never found state action based upon mere 'entwine-
ment."').
139. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299. "Although the findings and prior opinions in this
case include no express conclusion of law that public school officials act within the scope of
their duties when they represent their institutions, no other view would be rational . I..." ld
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 300.
143. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
144. Id.
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serve on the board of control and legislative council. 141 It also considered the
fact that the Association's ministerial employees were considered state em-
ployees for purposes of the state retirement system.' 46 The Court found the
sum result of these two forms of entwinement "unmistakable" and "over-
whelming," and that the evidence presented required the Association to be
considered a state actor.
147
b. Private Action That Is Not State Action
The Court has drawn boundaries to ensure that a state and a private enti-
ty may interact without the private entity automatically becoming a state
actor. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 148 the Court held that a private social
club did not become a state actor by virtue of its liquor license obtained from
the state liquor board. 149 Likewise, the State was not liable for the club's
racial discriminatory policies in so licensing them. 150 The Court held that
this case presented "nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between
lessor and lessee that was present in Burton," noting that "while Eagle was a
public restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in
a private building."' 1  In analyzing the relationship between the licensing
board and the club, the Court noted that the board "plays absolutely no part
in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club.' 52
The board's regulatory scheme was to keep track of the number of licenses in
a given jurisdiction and to regulate their use, and "cannot be said to in any
way foster or encourage racial discrimination.' 53 Thus, the State could not
be held in joint activity with the private club and the club's discriminatory
policies did not constitute state action.
54
However, the Court did enjoin the enforcement of one provision of the
board's regulations that required "'[e]very club licensee shall adhere to all of
the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws.""1 55 It reasoned that this
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 302.
148. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
149. See id. at 177, 179.
150. Id. at 175-77.
151. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 176-77.
154. See id. at 177.
155. Id.
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would be state enforcement of the Lodge's discriminatory policy if it were to
discipline the Lodge for violating its own policy of racial discrimination.'56
These standards were again tested in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
(NCAA) v. Tarkanian,57 with the Court holding that the NCAA is not a state
actor.'58 The University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), had disciplined its
basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian after an investigation and recommendation
by the NCAA. 5 9 Tarkanian filed suit against both UNLV and the NCAA
alleging due process violations in his termination. 160
The Court held that UNLV, as a public university, is clearly a state ac-
tor.16' The remaining question was whether, through UNLV's compliance
with NCAA rules and recommendations, the NCAA had transformed into a
state actor as well. 62 The Court answered this in the negative. 163 The Court
rejected the argument that the NCAA was involved in state action because
UNLV adopted the NCAA's governing rules or because UNLV had a small
level of involvement in drafting them.' 64 It concluded that "the source of the
legislation adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada but the collective member-
ship, speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular
State." 65 Lastly, the Court disagreed that UNLV had delegated its power to
the NCAA, noting that the entities were really adversaries in this transac-
tion. 66 The Court summed up the relationship by stating "[i]t would be more
appropriate to conclude that UNLV has conducted its athletic program under
color of the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that those policies
were developed and enforced under color of Nevada law.' 67
156. See id. at 178-79.
157. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
158. See id. at 199.
159. Id. at 180-81. The Court described the NCAA's findings as "38 violations of NCAA
rules by UNLV personnel, including 10 involving Tarkanian." Id. at 181. As for discipline
by the NCAA, it had placed the program on probation for two years and threatened further
sanctions if Tarkanian was not dismissed. Id.
160. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 181.
161. Id. at 192.
162. Id. at 193.
163. Id. at 195.
164. See id.
165. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193. In a footnote, the Court suggested that it may have re-
quired a different analysis if the NCAA were made up of only schools within a single state.
Id. at 193 n.13.
166. Id. at 196. The Court said that in disciplinary investigations, the NCAA is an adver-
sary of the institution being investigated, as it is looking out for the interests of all the other
member institutions. Id. It likened this to a state-paid public defender representing a client
against the state. Id.
167. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199.
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C. Privately-Contracted Security Guards and the State Action Doctrine
With this background, this section will show how private security
guards have been treated under the exceptions to the state action doctrine.
Whether a State's police power is an exclusive and traditional government
function remains untested by the United States Supreme Court. 168 This sec-
tion briefly describes the available case law on the subject. It focuses on the
police power delegated to private security guards and the results courts have
reached in such scenarios.
The Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Maryland169 involved a
claim that a private security guard enforced an amusement park's racially
discriminatory policy. 70 However, this particular guard was a deputized
sheriff by the state and wore a badge stating this.17' He nonetheless remained
under control of the park as to his duties. 72 The Court noted that the guard
"purported to exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff."'' 73 Furthermore, the
Court also noted that "[i]f an individual is possessed of state authority and
purports to act under that authority, his action is state action."'174 Thus, the
guard's actions constituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
175
While the Supreme Court has not revisited this particular issue, the
Griffin holding and the Flagg dicta which specifically listed "police protec-
tion" as an example of a possible exclusive governmental function have pro-
vided guidance for lower courts deciding this issue. 76 The cases turn on the
amount of authority delegated to the private security guards by the state. 
177
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals perhaps described the necessary fac-
tors best in Wade v. Byles. 78 In Wade, a private security guard at a housing
project was involved in an altercation that ended in the guard shooting the
168. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 n. 14 (1978).
169. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
170. See id. at 131.
171. Id. at 132.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 135.
174. Griffin, 378 U.S. at 135.
175. See id. at 137.
176. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978); see also Griffin, 378 U.S. at
137. The following cases are not intended to provide a complete overview of the case law by
any means, but instead were selected as examples of how the lower courts have decided the
issue. See, e.g., Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005); Payton v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999); Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d
902 (7th Cir. 1996).
177. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 640; Payton, 184 F.3d at 627; Wade, 83 F.3d at 905.
178. See 83 F.3d at 902, 905.
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plaintiff.'79 The court stated that the powers granted to the defendant, includ-
ing carrying a weapon, arresting trespassers until the police arrived, and
shooting in self-defense, while perhaps traditionally reserved to the state, are
not exclusively reserved to the state. 80 Based on this, the court held that the
defendant "was not a state actor when he [fired the] shot.''
Three years later, the Seventh Circuit confronted a factually different
claim in Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 82 and
found the security guard to be a state actor. 83 In Payton, the security guard
was stationed at a hospital, but he was also a "special police officer" under
city ordinance.' 84 As such, he was required to wear an issued badge and
"'conform to and be subject to all rules and regulations governing police
officers of the city.'" 85 The guard was granted broad authority by the ordin-
ance: "'[They] shall possess the powers of the regular police patrol at the
places for which they are respectively appointed or in the line of duty for
which they are engaged."",186 The court held that this broad authority in-
cluded functions traditionally and "exclusively reserved to the state.' 87 It
found most distinctive the fact that the guards were not confined to a specific
area nor were they limited in their arrest power as was the guard in Wade. 88
Finding "no legal difference exists between a privately employed special
officer with full police powers and a regular Chicago police officer," the
court held that the guards were participating in state action.'89
In Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C.,' 90 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that private casino security guards were state actors, citing
heavily to the Seventh Circuit's decisions.' 9' Romanski involved a casino
patron detained by the casino's security guards for several hours because she
179. Id. at 903. The defendant worked for a security company hired by the complex. Id.
The company was also named as a defendant in this action. Id.
180. Id. at 906.
181. Wade, 83 F.3d at 907. "If Wade's allegations are true, he may very well have a cog-
nizable tort claim, but it is not one of constitutional dimension." Id.
182. 184 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999).
183. ld. at 630.
184. Id. at 624-25.
185. id. at 625 (quoting CHI., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-340-100 (2008)).
186. Id. (quoting CH., ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-340-100 (2008)).
187. Payton, 184 F.3d at 630.
188. Compare id., with Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 1996). "[Clitizen's
arrests and the rights to carry handguns and use them in self-defense are available to individu-
als outside of the law enforcement community." See Payton, 184 F.3d at 629 (citing Wade, 83
F.3d at 906).
189. Id. at 630.
190. 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
191. Id. at 640.
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took a token from an unoccupied slot machine.192 As in Payton, a statute-
this time a state statute, not a city ordinance-gave special police authority to
the security guards. 93 This authority included "'the authority to arrest a per-
son without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers." 94 However,
the arrest must occur on casino property, thus, the Michigan statute seems
narrower than the Chicago ordinance in Payton, which had no such limita-
tion.1 95 Nonetheless, the court held that "[w]here private security guards are
endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto po-
lice officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function
test.', 196 Based on the statute and the arrest powers of the guards, the court
concluded the police power the guards were given was the exclusive and
traditional power of the state, and the guards were therefore state actors.
97
IV. SECTION 1983 AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
While this article has thus far focused on the state action doctrine and
its exceptions, this Part will discuss 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 has
proven an important tool for plaintiffs seeking remedies for federal constitu-
tional violations and would likely be part of a claim against a PSC, as many
of the state action cases discussed supra involved section 1983 claims.' 98
This Part will examine the history of section 1983 and briefly describe its
requirements and limits. It will also describe the availability of a Bivens
action, a judicially created right that acts as the federal counterpart to a sec-
192. Id. at 632-33. It probably did not help the defendants' case that the patron was a
seventy-two year old woman and the token she took from the machine was worth five cents.
Id. at 632.
193. See id. at 633; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1080 (2008).
194. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 633 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1080).
195. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1080, and Romanski, 428 F.3d at 633, with CHI.,
ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-340-100 (2008), and Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999). The ordinance in Payton allowed the guards "to
'do special duty at any fixed place in the city, or at any place necessary for protection of per-
sons, passengers and property."' Payton, 184 F.3d at 628 (quoting CH., ILL., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 4-340-030).
196. Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637 (citing Payton, 184 F.3d at 630; Henderson v. Fisher, 631
F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't Store, Inc., 654
F. Supp. 856, 857 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
197. Id. at 640 (citing and quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974)).
198. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
293 (2001); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1988); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).
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tion 1983 action.' 99 The relationship between the "state action" requirement
of the Due Process Clause and the section 1983 requirement of "acting under
color of state law" will then be discussed. Finally, this Part will analyze cas-
es involving section 1983 claims against privately run prisons, which will
serve as a basis for comparison to PSCs in Part V.
A. A Brief Background of Section 1983 and Its Relationship to the State
Action Doctrine
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code was originally passed
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and later codified to its present
state.200 The statute states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress..
201
The statute's main purpose is to provide redress for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2°  In order to plead a cognizable claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: that he or she was deprived of a
right guaranteed "by the 'Constitution and laws,"' and that the defendant was
acting "'under color of law.' 20 3 Among other relief, a successful § 1983
claim provides for reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff.2°4
Section 1983 and the state action doctrine are related, but are doctrinally
different when considering private parties. °5 In order to be liable under §
1983, a private party must be acting "under color of state law. ' 2°  To fall
within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, a private party must meet
199. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 407-08 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
200. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
202. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982) (quoting Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972)).
203. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
205. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928 n.8.
206. Id. at 935.
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one of the exceptions to the state action doctrine.27 In Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 208 the Court analyzed the relationship between the two standards.
21
The Lugar Court held that if state action was found to be present, then the
"acting under color of state law" requirement of § 1983 would be satisfied as
well.210 It is important to note that the converse of this rule is not necessarily
true; that is, not all valid § 1983 "acting under color of law" claims automati-
cally equate state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21
'
One more facet of § 1983 must be mentioned. Section 1983 applies to
those only under color of state law.212 It is silent to federal actors.21 3 In Bi-
vens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 214 the
Court found an implied cause of action for damages for certain constitutional
violations by federal actors.215 While the initial Bivens decision was limited
to a violation of the Fourth Amendment,1 6 it has been extended to violations
of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.217 However, the Court has stressed the
extraordinariness of Bivens as a remedy, noting that the only circumstances
in which it has been used are when individual actors violated one's constitu-
tional rights and there was no alternative remedy for the violation.218 The
207. See id. at 926.
208. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
209. See id.
210. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. "[Pletitioner was deprived of his property through state
action; respondents were, therefore, acting under color of state law in participating in that
deprivation." Id. The Court also commented on the inequity that would result if "state ac-
tion" was not held to equate to "color of law" for § 1983 purposes:
To read the "under color of any statute" langnage [sic] of the Act in such a way as to im-
pose a limit on those Fourteenth Amendment violations that may be redressed by the § 1983
cause of action would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of § I of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13, from which § 1983 is derived.
Id. at 934.
211. Id. at 935 n.18; see also Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1464 (1Oth Cir. 1996); 15 AM.
JUR. 2D CIVIL RIGHTS § 73 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).
213. See id.
214. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
215. See id. at 396-97.
216. See id. at 397.
217. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980) (finding a Bivens action for a
violation by federal actors of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229-30 (1979) (finding a Bivens action for a
violation by federal actors of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). But see Bush
v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens to a First Amendment viola-
tion).
218. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,70(2001).
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two extensions mentioned above are the only two times the Court has found
both factors met.219
B. Privately-Run Prisons and § 1983
This section will analyze the treatment of privately-run prisons under §
1983. The phenomenon of privatizing state and federal prisons provides a
workable analogy to that of privatizing the military in the form of PSCs. 2 0
In both cases, private actors are delegated a certain amount of authority to
control others. One such private actor is Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA).22  CCA, now a publicly traded company, claims it is the nation's
largest provider of jail, detention and corrections services to governmental
agencies with 75,000 total inmates 222 in nineteen states and the District of
Columbia. 3 It also contends that these figures make it the fourth largest
correctional system in the United States, behind the federal prison system
and those of two states. 2
4
Privately-run prisons are not a new invention; rather, they have been in
use since the nation's founding.22 5 Both federal and state governments cur-
rently utilize these facilities.226 However, private prisons under contract with
the federal government have been treated slightly different than private pris-
ons under contract with a state government for state action and § 1983 liabili-
ty purposes.
219. Id. "In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice...
" d.
220. See Corrections Corporation of America, http://www.correctionscorp.comlabout (last
visited Apr. 4, 2009) [hereinafter CCA].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Facility Locations, http://www.corrections
corp.comfacitlities/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
224. CCA, supra note 220.
225. Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, Note, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and
Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. CORP. L. 577, 582-83 (2008).
226. id. One author argues that while the use of private prisons by individual states has
begun to decrease, the federal government's use of these entities has significantly increased
over the past decade. Matthew T. Tikonoff, Note, A Final Frontier in Prison Litigation:
Does Bivens Extend to Employees of Private Prisons Who Violate the Constitution?, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 985-87 (2007). This is attributed to the crackdown on federal drug
crimes as well as the increase in detainees after 9/1I. Id. at 986-87.
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1. Section 1983 Claims Against Private Prisons Housing State
Prisoners
In Richardson v. McKnight,227 the State of Tennessee had contracted
with a private corporation to house inmates.228 Two private guards claimed
immunity from alleged § 1983 violations. 229 The Court held that qualified
immunity did not extend to employees of private prisons. 230 It did not ex-
pressly rule on whether the guards' actions were considered those of a state
actor, but ordered the lower court to decide this on standard state action
precedent.23' Justice Rehnquist's dicta in another case suggested that the
claim would be valid: "[T]he private facility in question housed state pris-
oners-prisoners who already enjoy a right of action against private correc-
tional providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "232
Several courts have agreed with Justice Rehnquist and have not only
held that § 1983 is available, but also that privately-run prisons under state
contract have satisfied the "under color of law" requirement.233 In fact, the
Sixth Circuit held this as early as 1991, well before the quoted dicta in Cor-
rectional Services Corp. v. Malesko234 appeared.235 In so holding, the court
appeared to consider both the public function and the nexus exceptions to the
state action doctrine.236 The Fifth Circuit later agreed after Richardson:
"[c]learly, confinement of wrongdoers-though sometimes delegated to pri-
227. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
228. Id. at 402.
229. Id. at 401-02; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (holding that
qualified immunity under § 1983 "is available only to [state] officials performing discretio-
nary functions").
230. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412. The dissent vigorously disagreed, noting:
Today's decision says that two sets of prison guards who are indistinguishable in the ul-
timate source of their authority over prisoners, indistinguishable in the powers that they pos-
sess over prisoners, and indistinguishable in the duties that they owe toward prisoners, are to
be treated quite differently in the matter of their financial liability.
Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at413-14.
232. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko. 534 U.S. 61, 72 n.5 (2001). But see Holly v. Scott,
434 F.3d 287, 292 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) ("It is an open question in this circuit whether § 1983
imposes liability upon employees of a private prison facility under contract with a state. We
need not decide that issue here.").
233. See, e.g., Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
234. 534U.S.at6l.
235. Skelton, 963 F.2d at 102.
236. See id. "As a detention center, Pri-Cor is no doubt performing a public function
traditionally reserved to the state." Id. "'There is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of [Pri-Cor] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself."' Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
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vate entities-is a fundamentally governmental function., 237 The Tenth Cir-
cuit has at least suggested the same in dicta. 8
2. Bivens Claims Against Private Prisons Housing Federal Prisoners
The Court was more restrictive of a federal prisoner's rights against a
privately-run prison. 2 3 9 In Malesko, the Court held that Bivens actions were
unavailable to a federal prisoner against a private corporation.24° This was
due, in part, to the fact that the prisoner would not have been able to file an
action against anyone but the individual if it were a federally-run prison.24'
The Tenth Circuit held that Malesko barred a Bivens action against an em-
ployee as well as a privately-run prison itself.242 In Holly v. Scott,2 43 the
Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that the plaintiff had other options under state
law.244 On the other hand, some federal district courts have read Malesko
more broadly and allowed Bivens actions against the individual employees. 245
No circuit has joined this view to date.
V. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The state action doctrine has remained untested against PSCs under
contract with the federal or state governments. In Gantt v. Security, USA,
Inc.,246 the plaintiff claimed that Security, USA, a PSC, violated her Fifth
Amendment rights after informing the company of a protective order against
her ex-boyfriend.2 7 She claimed that she needed to remain indoors and se-
237. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
238. See Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005) (Ebel, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part), vacated en banc, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). While
this appears only in a concurrence in part, Judge Ebel was using this as an example of the
asymmetry between § 1983 and Bivens in private prison settings. See id. He does not suggest
that there is any question that the § 1983 claim is available. See id.
239. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 72. "The prisoner may not bring a Bivens claim against the officer's employer,
the United States, or the BOP. With respect to the alleged constitutional deprivation, his only
remedy lies against the individual ... ." Id.
242. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108.
243. 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
244. Id. at 296-97.
245. See Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 362-63 (D.N.J. 2004); Purkey v. CCA Det.
Ctr., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1149-51 (D. Kan. 2004); Sarro v. Comell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp.
2d 52, 63 (D.R. I. 2003).
246. 356 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2004).
247. Id. at 549.
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cure, but the company forced her to work outdoors, where she was kid-
napped at gunpoint and raped. 48 The court noted that there was no evidence
to show that Security, USA was anything but a private company.24 9
Under this article's analysis, the PSCs will be operating under contract
with either the federal or a state government; a factor not present in Gantt.
While Gantt may stand for the principle that a PSC standing alone is not a
state acto/PSCSr, when it operates under governmental contract for the pur-
pose for governmental security or related objectives, the analysis changes
dramatically. 2 0 This part will analyze whether a PSC meets one of the ex-
ceptions to the state action doctrine and is therefore liable for constitutional
violations. It argues that a court could find that a PSC is a state actor under
either the "public function" or the "symbiotic relationship" exception to the
state action doctrine.
A. PSCs Under the Public Function Test
The first argument that a potential plaintiff could make is that providing
security for United States citizens is an exclusive and traditional government
function. If this is an exclusive and traditional government function, then the
PSC would be liable as a state actor if it violates one's federal constitutional
rights when contracting with a state or federal government to provide servic-
es.
The best way for a potential plaintiff to frame an argument is to com-
pare PSCs, such as Blackwater, to private security guards that have been held
as state actors. The plaintiff could also point to the dicta from Flagg Bros.,
which specifically listed "police protection" as an example of a possible ex-
clusive governmental function.251 However, the Flagg Bros. Court specifi-
cally pointed out that it was not ruling on the matter, and it never had ruled
on whether police protection was a traditional and exclusive governmental
function.252 Thus, the plaintiff would be left to distinguish PSCs based sub-
stantially on the case law from the lower courts.
In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that a deputized security guard, who
used the appearance of police authority at a private amusement park, was a
state actor. 3 Wade held that a private security guard, who only had the
power to carry a gun and arrest trespassers until the police came inside the
248. Id. at 550-51.
249. Id. at 552.
250. See generally id.
251. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978).
252. Id. at 163-64 n.14.
253. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S 130, 135 (1964).
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apartment complex, was not a state actor. 4 The courts in Payton and Ro-
manski found state action by private security guards, but only in the presence
of a broad statutory grant of authority.255
The Blackwater employees in New Orleans were deputized by the State
of Louisiana, which carried with it the power to make arrests and use
force.256 They wore Louisiana law enforcement badges around their necks
and were allowed to carry loaded weapons. 7 This deputization by the state
governor would likely prove analogous to the delegation of police power by
ordinance in Payton and by state statute in Romanski.258 The authority goes
beyond what was given to the guard in Wade.259 There were no similar limi-
tations on location or arrest power.260 A court would most likely find that a
PSC was a state actor in a Katrina-like scenario.
In addition, by a state or federal government contracting for a PSC's
services, another element could be added to the analysis. This is the fact that
the security company is directly contracted with the government, rather than
working directly for another private actor.26' A plaintiff might consider
claiming that this in itself establishes state action and no exceptions are
needed to prove that the PSC is a state actor.262 However, this would be a
difficult argument to make. In Lebron, the Court held that Amtrak, a gov-
263ernment-sponsored corporation, was a state actor. However, a key to that
holding was that the government reserved the power to appoint members of
the board of directors. 264 There is no evidence suggesting that any govern-
ment has any amount of control over Blackwater's board of directors or over
any other PSC.265 Thus, this argument would be difficult for a plaintiff to
make, and would most likely fail.
In sum, the factors discussed above would likely result in a finding of
state action under the exclusive and traditional public function exception to
254. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902,906 (7th Cir. 1996).
255. See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir.
1999); Romanski v. Detriot Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005).
256. See SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 324. "'He was even deputized by the governor of the
[Sitate of Louisiana. We can make arrests and use lethal force if we deem it necessary.'...
Blackwater spokesperson Anne Duke also said the company had a letter from Louisiana offi-
cials authorizing its forces to carry loaded weapons." Id.
257. Id.
258. See Payton, 184 F.3d at 624-25; Romanski, 428 F.3d at 633.
259. See Wade, 83 F.3d at 906.
260. Compare id., with SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 324.
261. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1995).
262. Seeid. at 381.
263. Id. at 400.
264. See id.
265. See generally SCAHILL, supra note 22.
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the state action doctrine. While Blackwater, or any other PSC, would not
likely be considered an actual part of a government by contracting with it, a
plaintiff could prove that the authority delegated to PSCs was that of an ex-
clusive and traditional state function.2  With this finding, a PSC would be
liable for federal constitutional violations when acting under such a grant of
authority.267
B. PSCs Under the Nexus Test
If the prior analysis is flawed, or simply unsuccessful in court, a plain-
tiff could also attempt to show that the nexus between the state and the PSC
was so close that the private conduct rose to the level of state action.268
The best argument for a plaintiff would be that the government and the
PSC enjoy a symbiotic relationship, as did the restaurant and the state in Bur-
to.269 She could claim that the PSC gets a lucrative contract. The state gets
security detail without having to train, house, and supervise the private
guards. The state also benefits from the hopeful decrease in crime and in-
crease in public order by having the additional security.
However, to meet the Burton standard, a plaintiff would have to show a
high level of interdependence. 270 To revisit an earlier quotation, "'we all
coordinate with each other-one family.' ' 27' To add to this, the descriptions
of the dress and armor PSC employees possess do not seem to differentiate
them from a state police force or militia.272 To the uninformed, it would like-
ly be difficult to tell whether an individual employee worked for a PSC or
the state.273 A court could consider this evidence of interdependence and that
the state "elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the" PSC
just as it would its own police force.274
A court could also consider the Tarkanian holding when making its de-
cision. In Tarkanian, one problem the Court had was that no state controlled
the NCAA.275 Here, the PSC would have a contract with a specific govern-
mental entity, whether an individual state or the federal government. This
266. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394-95.
267. See id. at 400.
268. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716, 726 (1961).
269. See id. at 726.
270. See id. at 725.
271. SCAHILL, supra note 22, at 329.
272. See id. at 321-22.
273. See id.
274. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
275. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988).
2009]
29
Dittenber: Blackwater and Beyond: Can Potential Plaintiffs Sue Private Secur
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAWREVIEW
would show a higher level of control by the state than was present in Tarka-
nian as a PSC would have a specific authority to abide by.276
The plaintiff might try to invoke the Brentwood "entwinement" excep-
tion as well.277 However, this would prove less successful. There does not
appear to be the pervasive entwinement between the state and the PSC that
was found in Brentwood. 8 In Brentwood, the Court found entwinement
both "bottom up" and "top down., 279 There is no evidence to suggest that
Blackwater's CEO serves on any governmental board due to the relationship.
Likewise, there is no evidence that a governmental actor is involved in the
business of the corporation. The necessary "overlapping identity" between
the PSC and the government is not present.280 Even though the Brentwood
test is sometimes seen as less rigid, and more of a balancing test, than the
other state action tests, 28' this scenario lacks the structural entwinement
present in Brentwood.282 Thus, Brentwood, standing alone, would more like-
ly point to a holding that a PSC is not a state actor.
A PSC might point to Moose Lodge to try to differentiate its actions
from the arguments made above. It could argue that the state is simply li-
censing and regulating its ability to provide security. It would analogize this
to the situation in Moose Lodge where a private club was held not to be a
state actor despite regulation from the state liquor board.283 The PSC would
attempt to distinguish the relationship with the state from Burton and show
that it was more like the one found in Moose Lodge. However, the level of
interdependence might be too much for the PSC to overcome. As previously
discussed, the outward appearance of the PSC's employees is nearly indis-
tinguishable from other soldiers or state officers. The PSC would not remain
a private entity on private property, as the Moose Lodge was;284 it would be
highly visible and possibly on public lands during its missions. The relation-
276. See id.
277. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 297 (2001).
278. See id. at 302.
279. Id. at 300.
280. See, e.g., Megan M. Cooper, Case Note, Dusting off the Old Play Book: How the
Supreme Court Disregarded the Blum Trilogy, Returned to Theories of the Past, and Found
State Action Through Entwinement in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass'n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913, 923 (2002). However, the author argues that the
extension in Brentwood was unnecessary and state action could have been found through other
exceptions. Id. at 990-91.
281. See James Potter, Comment, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and
Due Process, 155 U. PAL. REV. 1269, 1290-91 (2007).
282. See id.
283. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972).
284. See id. at 175.
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ship between the government and the PSC would be much closer to that in
Burton than in Moose Lodge.
For the reasons stated, a court should hold that a PSC, when providing
security under contract with a state or federal government contract, is a state
actor under the nexus exception. The strongest argument for this finding
would be that they enjoy a symbiotic and interdependent relationship.
VI. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983
The previous part attempted to answer the question of whether a PSC
would be considered a state actor when accused of a federal constitutional
violation by a U.S. citizen. Now, consider a situation in which overzealous
PSCs employees violate the federal constitutional rights of an individual.
Perhaps the employees fire their weapons at an innocent person, as is cur-
rently alleged by Blackwater's actions in Iraq, and deprive that person of life
without due process. A less violent example would be that the PSC decides
to conduct its hiring decisions based on discrimination that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause. In either scenario, a state actor would be liable for
these federal constitutional violations. Relief would most likely be sought in
the form of a section 1983 action against the actors.285 This part recognizes
this "real-world" solution and attempts to illustrate how a lawsuit might pro-
ceed under the precedent guiding section 1983 claims and Bivens actions as
applied to private prisons.
A. Violation of Constitution by PSC with State Government Contract
This part envisions a Katrina-like scenario. A PSC acts under state
government authority to provide security and maintain order in an emergen-
cy situation.
The wronged individual might consider filing a section 1983 action
against the individuals that searched him and against the PSC itself. As part
of his or her claim, it would have to be alleged that the PSC, and its agents,
were acting under color of state law during the illegal activity. 286 As dis-
cussed supra, the plaintiff should be successful in meeting this burden.287
The requirements of a state actor would automatically result in a finding that
the PSC or its agents were acting under color of law.288 Furthermore, there
285. See discussion supra Part III.
286. See supra Part IV.
287. See id. for the argument that a PSC is a state actor under these circumstances.
288. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982); discussion supra Part
III.A.
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are situations where a finding of state action is not required for the actor to
be "under-color-of-state-law. 289
Having decided that section 1983 can be used, it must be decided
against whom. States are immune from suit.2' Thus, the "stripping doc-
trine," a judicially created legal fiction, is used to answer claims against a
state.29' So the plaintiff here must sue the director of the PSC in his personal
capacity in order to recover damages.292 The employee may also be sued
under section 1983.93 It could be argued that Richardson could be applied to
this context as well. If it was, then the employees would not have the de-
fense of qualified immunity available.
B. Violation of Constitution by PSC with Federal Government Contract
This section assumes a similar scenario as discussed above, but now the
PSC's contract is with the federal government. The difference from the
above analysis will occur when deciding who can be liable to suit. The
plaintiff would not have a statutory cause of action under section 1983 avail-
able against a federal actor, but instead, the implied Bivens action. The ques-
tion would be who the plaintiff could file that suit against. If the prison
analogy holds, the answer may very well be no one. Under Malesko, the
PSC could not be sued, as the Court held that Bivens actions do not extend to
private corporations.294 Whether it could be extended to the individual em-
ployees of the PSC is an open question for now, but the majority opinion
seems to suggest not.
295
Thus, while a PSC may engage in the same conduct as a state actor
while contracting with a state or the federal government, following the pri-
vate prison analogy, the availability of suit may depend on the relationship.
289. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.j 8.
290. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
291. See generally Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
292. See id. at 159-60.
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
294. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,74 (2001).
295. See generally id. At least one author has recognized this limitation of Malesko and
suggests that Bivens actions should be available to foreign citizens who have suffered at the
hands of civilian contractors. See Scott J. Borrowman, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and Abu Ghraib-Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Military Per-
sonnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 416-17 (2005). The author sug-
gests that the same action would give rise to a Bivens claim "if committed against a U.S. citi-
zen." Id. at 417. However, the case he cites involves a public prison, not a private one. See
id. at 417-18. It has never been decided by the Court if Bivens extends to employees of pri-
vate prisons.
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While a PSC may engage in state action while under contract with the federal
government, the plaintiff may be left with the same remedies as it would
have been without a PSC held to be a state actor.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article poses a hypothetical that may be tested in the near future. It
offers a hypothetical violation of the federal Constitution by a PSC and then
asks whether that entity could be held to be a state actor if it was operating
under a government contract. This article argues that the answer to that
question is relatively straightforward. A PSC would most likely be held to
be a state actor in that situation. A court could use either the "exclusive and
traditional public function" or the "nexus" exception to the state action test to
so hold. However, a more difficult question is how a potential plaintiff
would be able to seek redress upon this finding. Section 1983 may provide
an avenue for relief for when a PSC is under contract with a state govern-
ment. However, the issue is less clear when a PSC is under contract with the
federal government. The Court has thus far refused to extend Bivens actions
to private corporations. Thus, federal constitutional violations by a PSC un-
der contract with the federal government may still not have a proper remedy,
and PSCs may still be able to operate in a way inconsistent with what a fed-
eral agent would be allowed under the Constitution.
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